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Abstract
As per Einstein’s design, particles are introduced into the double-slit experiment through a small
hole in a plate which can either move up and down (and its momentum can be measured) or
be stopped (and its position can be measured). Suppose one measures the position of the plate
and this act verifies the statement that the interference pattern is observed in the experiment.
However, if it is possible to think about the outcome that one would have obtained if one had
measured plate’s momentum instead of its position, then it is possible to consider, together
with the aforesaid statement, another statement that each particle passes through either slit of
the double-slit screen. Hence, the proposition affirming the wave-like behavior and the proposi-
tion affirming the particle-like behavior might be true together, which would imply that Bohr’s
complementarity principle is incorrect. The analysis of Einstein’s design and ways to refute
it based on an approach that uses exclusively assignments of the truth values to experimental
propositions is presented in this paper.
Keywords: Truth-value assignment; Hilbert lattice; Invariant-subspace lattices; Counterfac-
tual definiteness; EPR paradox; Double-slit experiment.
1 Introduction
According to Bohr’s complementarity principle, one can observe either the wave-like behavior or
the particle-like behavior, but not both simultaneously. The emblematical example of complemen-
tarity of these behaviors is the double-slit experiment, which, in the words of Feynman, “has in it
the heart of quantum mechanics” [1].
Within a mathematical model allowing one to reason about the truth or falsehood of experimentally
verifiable statements, the double-slit experiment can be described in this way. Let Pwave-like denote
the proposition affirming the wave-like behavior (i.e., the statement saying that the interference
pattern is observed in the experiment) and Pparticle-like denote the proposition affirming the particle-
like behavior (i.e., the statement saying that a particle passes through either slit). Then it follows
that, consistent with Bohr’s principle, Pparticle-like cannot be true when Pwave-like is true, and vice
versa. That is, these propositions cannot have the value of true simultaneously. In symbols,
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[[
Pwave-like
]]
v
6=
[[
Pparticle-like
]]
v
, (1)
where the double-bracket notation is used to denote a valuation v, i.e., a mapping from the set of
propositions {P} to the set of the truth values, true and false, renamed to 1 and 0 respectively:
v : {P} → {1, 0} . (2)
In 1927, during the 5th Solvay Conference, Einstein designed of a modified version of the double-slit
experiment intended to demonstrate the violation of (1) and, thus, the inconsistency of quantum
mechanics [2].
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Figure 1: Einstein’s version of the double-slit experiment
Imagine the double-slit experiment in which a plate that has a hole in it (depicted as plate 1 in
Fig. 1) is added in front of the double-slit screen (plate 2). Plate 1 can move up and down and
its momentum p can be measured. If a particle coming through the hole in plate 1 is deflected
in the direction of the double-slit screen, then the particle transfers a momentum to plate 1. By
determining whether this momentum is positive or negative, one can make known the slit – either
A or B – that the particle got through flying to plate 3. In contrast, if plate 1 is stopped and its
position x is measured, one can know exactly where the particle starts its route to plate 3.
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Suppose that position x of plate 1 is measured; in that case, the interference pattern can be observed,
and so the proposition Pwave-like can be verified. But if reliable measurements of counterfactual and
definite kind are possible, then, together with the factual value of x, one may consider every
imaginable value of momentum p of plate 1. So, the proposition Pparticle-like can be thought as
verified together with the proposition Pwave-like, that is,
[[
Pwave-like
]]
v
=
[[
Pparticle-like
]]
v
= 1 , (3)
implying that the complementarity principle must be incorrect.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze Einstein’s design and ways to refute it using exclusively
assignments of the truth values to experimental propositions.
2 Definitions and preliminaries
In a mathematical model, which makes it possible for one to assign the value of true or false to
experimentally verifiable (testable) statements relating to a quantum system, each proposition1 is
uniquely represented by a closed linear subspace of a Hilbert space H associated with the system
[3, 4]. Consequently, the proposition P is assigned the value of true if and only if the system is in
the pure state |Ψ〉 belonging to the subspace HP that uniquely represents P [5]. Symbolically, this
can be expressed as
[[
P (|Ψ〉 ∈ HP )
]]
v
= 1 , (4)
where P (|Ψ〉 ∈ HP ) stands for “P in the state |Ψ〉 ∈ HP ”. Otherwise, i.e., if the system is in the
pure state that does not reside in HP , the proposition P is assigned the value of false:
[[
P (|Ψ〉 /∈ HP )
]]
v
= 0 . (5)
Together with the determined in such a way truth or falsehood of the proposition P , which can
be labelled a factual truth-value of P , one can consider a counterfactual truth-value of P , namely,
either of the truth values, 1 or 0, that would have been taken by P if, instead of the state |Ψ〉 ∈ HP
or |Ψ〉 /∈ HP , the system had been in the state |Ψ〉 ∈ HQ where HQ is a closed linear subspace of
the Hilbert space H that does not represent P .
In order to have a particular meaning, the counterfactual truth-value of the proposition P in the
state |Ψ〉 ∈ HQ, must depend on the lattice-theoretic ordering relation ≤ over the subspaces HQ
and HP .
1Even though the nature or existence of propositions as abstract meanings is still a matter of philosophical
controversy, for the purposes of this paper, the phrases ”statement” and ”proposition” are used interchangeably.
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For example, suppose that the subspaces HQ and HP are members of the same poset (partially
ordered set) L and they are comparable with each other, specifically, HQ ≤ HP . In this case, the
state |Ψ〉 lying in the subspaceHQ belongs to the subspaceHP as well. Therefore, the counterfactual
truth-value of the proposition P in |Ψ〉 ∈ HQ can be treated the same as the factual truth-value of
P in |Ψ〉 ∈ HP ; explicitly,
{HQ,HP} ⊆ L, HQ ≤ HP :
[[
P (|Ψ〉 ∈ HQ)
]]
v
=
[[
P (|Ψ〉 ∈ HP )
]]
v
= 1 . (6)
By contrast, suppose that {HQ,HP } ⊆ L but HQ and HP are incomparable with each other, i.e.,
HQ  HP and HP  HQ. This means that HQ ∩ HP = {0}, where ∩ denotes the set-theoretic
operation of intersection, while {0} is the zero-dimensional subspace, a proper subset of any closed
linear subspace of H. In such a case, the state |Ψ〉 ∈ HQ can be a member of HP only if |Ψ〉 = 0,
where 0 is the zero-vector, the solitary vector contained in {0}. But, since any state |Ψ〉 of the
physical system must differ from 0, it follows that the counterfactual truth-value of P in |Ψ〉 ∈ HQ
can be treated the same as the factual truth-value of P in |Ψ〉 /∈ HP , that is,
{HQ,HP } ⊆ L, HQ  HP ,HP  HQ:
[[
P (|Ψ〉 ∈ HQ)
]]
v
=
[[
P (|Ψ〉 /∈ HP )
]]
v
= 0 . (7)
To determine how a closed linear subspace HP of a Hilbert space H can uniquely represent a
proposition P , recall that HP is the range of the projection operator Pˆ (i.e., self-adjoint idempotent
operator) acting on H [6]. Explicitly, HP is the subset of the vectors |Ψ〉 ∈ H that are in the image
of the projection operator Pˆ :
HP ≡ ran(Pˆ ) =
{
|Ψ〉 ∈ H: Pˆ |Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉
}
. (8)
As the set of the eigenvalues of Pˆ is contained in {0, 1}, one can consider bijective correspondence
between projection operators and propositions. Providing such correspondence, one gets an iso-
morphism from the set of propositions {P} to the set of the ranges of the projection operators
{ran(Pˆ )}, explicitly,
P ⇐⇒ ran(Pˆ ) . (9)
Recall that a set of two or more nontrivial projection operators on H (i.e., ones that differ from
the identity operator 1ˆ and the zero operator 0ˆ = 1ˆ− 1ˆ) is called a context Σ
Σ = {Pˆ} (10)
if any two members of Σ, say PˆA and PˆB , are orthogonal to each other, i.e.,
PˆAPˆB = PˆBPˆA = 0ˆ , (11)
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and the resolution of identity is associated with Σ:
∑
Pˆ∈Σ
Pˆ = 1ˆ . (12)
In view of (9), one may also regard the context as the set of the compatible propositions Σ = {P}.
For a Hermitian operator with the continuous spectrum (such as the position x and the momentum
p), the projection operator PˆU , which relates to an interval U = [u, u+∆u], takes the form
PˆU ≡
∫ u+∆u
u
du |u〉〈u| , (13)
so that the projection operator PˆU ′ relating to another interval U
′ = [u′, u′ +∆u′] is orthogonal to
PˆU if and only if U and U
′ do not intersect. Correspondingly, in that case the resolution of identity
takes the form
∫
du |u〉〈u| = 1 . (14)
Since a subspace P ⊆ H is invariant under the projection operator Pˆ on H if the image of any
vector |Ψ〉 in P under Pˆ remains within P and so
PˆP =
{
|Ψ〉 ∈ P: Pˆ |Ψ〉
}
⊆ P , (15)
the set of all invariant subspaces P of H invariant under the projection operator Pˆ is determined
by
L(Pˆ ) =
{
P ⊆ H: PˆP ⊆ P
}
. (16)
Consider the set of the invariant subspaces L(Σ) invariant under every projection operator from
the context Σ:
L(Σ) =
⋂
Pˆ∈Σ
L(Pˆ ) . (17)
The elements of this set form a complete lattice called the invariant-subspace lattice of the context Σ
[7]. It is straightforward to verify that each invariant-subspace lattice L(Σ) contains only mutually
commuting subspaces (corresponding to mutually commutable projection operators), which means
that each L(Σ) is a Boolean algebra.
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Because Pˆ{0} ⊆ {0} and PˆH ⊆ H for all Pˆ ∈ Σ, the subspaces {0} and H are elements of each
invariant-subspace lattice L(Σ).
Let O = {Σ} be the set of all the contexts associated with the quantum system. Then, the collection
of the invariant-subspace lattices that is in one-to-one correspondence with O can be defined as
{L(Σ)} ≡
{
Σ ∈ O : L(Σ)
}
. (18)
If all the lattices L(Σ) from the collection {L(Σ)} are pasted (or stitched) together at their common
elements (i.e., aside from identical elements, the subspaces {0} and H), namely,
L(H) =
⋃
Σ∈O
L(Σ) , (19)
where ∪ denotes the set-theoretic union carried out simultaneously on elements of {L(Σ)}, then
the resulted logic L(H) will be the Hilbert lattice, the complete orthomodular lattice based on all
closed linear subspaces of the Hilbert space H [8]. Thus, the Hilbert lattice L(H) is the union of
the collection {L(Σ)}.
Within this union, any two subspaces HQ and HP – regardless of whether they are elements of
one invariant-subspace lattice or belong to two different lattices – constitute a two-element subset
of L(H); in symbols, {HQ,HP } ⊆ L(H). Consequently, within the structure of L(H), any two
subspaces HQ and HP are either comparable or incomparable with each other, which means that
the counterfactual truth-value of the proposition P in the state |Ψ〉 ∈ HQ is always definite. In
symbols,
∀{HQ,HP } ⊆ L(H):
[[
P (|Ψ〉∈HQ)
]]
v
∈ {1, 0} . (20)
3 EPR paradox in the double-slit experiment
By reason of interaction, in Einstein’s version of the double-slit experiment, plate 1 and a particle
become a combined system, which is associated with the tensor product
Hcombined ≡ Hplate1 ⊗Hparticle (21)
of the two Hilbert spaces Hplate1 and Hparticle for plate 1 and the particle, respectively. The pure
state of this combined system is described by
|Ψcombined〉 ≡ |Ψplate1〉 ⊗ |Ψparticle〉 , (22)
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where |Ψplate1〉 and |Ψparticle〉 denote the pure states of plate 1 and the particle correspondingly.
After the measurement is performed on plate 1 – of either position x or momentum p – the state
|Ψcombined〉 resides in one of the following closed linear subspaces:
HcombinedX ≡ H
plate1
X ⊗H
particle
X , (23)
HcombinedP± ≡ H
plate1
P± ⊗H
particle
P± , (24)
where Hplate1X is the subspace representing the proposition “Position x of plate 1 is in interval X”
(this proposition is symbolized by P plate1X ); similarly, H
particle
X is the subspace that represents the
proposition “Position x of the particle is in interval X” (symbolized by P particleX ). In the same way,
Hplate1P± and H
particle
P± are the subspaces representing respectively the propositions “Momentum p of
plate 1 is positive (negative)” and “Momentum p of the particle is positive (negative)”, symbolized
by P plate1P± and P
particle
P± in that order. Subsequently, the subspace H
combined
X represents the propo-
sition (P plate1X ⊓ P
particle
X ), while the subspaces H
combined
P+ and H
combined
P− represent the propositions
(P plate1P+ ⊓ P
particle
P+ ) and (P
plate1
P− ⊓ P
particle
P− ).
Assume that immediately after the particle passes plate 1, one measures the position of this plate
and finds x ∈ X. Upon doing so, one verifies the proposition P plate1X , which can be written down
as
[[
P plate1X
(
|Ψplate1〉∈H
plate1
X
) ]]
v
= 1 . (25)
Within the structure of the Hilbert lattice L(Hplate1), i.e., the union
L(Hplate1) =
⋃
Σ∈Oplate1
L(Σ) , (26)
where Oplate1 denotes the set of all the contexts associated with plate 1, the subspace Hplate1X is
incomparable with both subspacesHplate1P+ andH
plate1
P− . In keeping with (7), this entails the following
counterfactual truth-values of the propositions P plate1P+ and P
plate1
P− in the state |Ψplate1〉 ∈ H
plate1
X :
[[
P plate1P±
(
|Ψplate1〉∈H
plate1
X
) ]]
v
= 0 . (27)
After the measurement of the position of plate 1, the combined system is in the state |Ψcombined〉
lying in HcombinedX . Within the structure of the Hilbert lattice L(H
combined), namely,
L(Hcombined) =
⋃
Σ∈Ocombined
L(Σ) , (28)
where Ocombined denotes the set of all the contexts associated with the combined system, the
subspace HcombinedX is incomparable with both subspaces H
combined
P+ and H
combined
P− . Accordingly, in
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the product state |Ψcombined〉 ∈ H
combined
X one must assign the counterfactual value of false to the
propositions (P plate1P± ⊓ P
particle
P± ):
[[ (
P plate1P± ⊓ P
particle
P±
)(
|Ψcombined〉∈H
combined
X
) ]]
v
= 0 . (29)
Then again, in the product state |Ψcombined〉 ∈ H
combined
X those propositions are equivalent to the
disjunctions of the propositions and so
[[
P plate1P±
(
|Ψplate1〉∈H
plate1
X
)
⊓ P particleP±
(
|Ψparticle〉∈H
particle
X
) ]]
v
= 0 . (30)
If the truth values 0 and 1 are interpreted as integers, this can be expressed with the ordinary
operation of multiplication ×; as a result, the statement (29) can be rewritten as
[[
P plate1P±
(
|Ψplate1〉∈H
plate1
X
) ]]
v
×
[[
P particleP±
(
|Ψparticle〉∈H
particle
X
) ]]
v
= 0 . (31)
Due to (27), it is consistent with
[[
P particleP+
(
|Ψparticle〉∈H
particle
X
) ]]
v
×
[[
P particleP−
(
|Ψparticle〉∈H
particle
X
) ]]
v
= 0 (32)
and may entail the equivalence:
[[
P particleX
(
|Ψparticle〉∈H
particle
X
) ]]
v
=
[[
P particleP±
(
|Ψparticle〉∈H
particle
X
) ]]
v
= 1 . (33)
Let’s analyze the meaning of this equivalence. The truth of the proposition P particleX signifies the
interference pattern. Indeed, as it is shown in the paper [9], all particles that start at the posi-
tion x ∈ X form a sub-ensemble whose contribution to the total interference pattern on plate 3
is perfect. On the other hand, the truth of the proposition P particleP+ or P
particle
P− indicates a fairly
good knowledge of the path of each particle: If P particleP+ is true, then one will guess that the par-
ticle passed through slit A; and if P particleP− is true, then the particle apparently passed through
slit B. Thus, the equivalence (33) means that it is possible to know the path of each particle in
the sub-ensemble |Ψparticle〉 ∈ H
particle
X without disturbing the interference pattern. This contradicts
quantum mechanics which predicts that the measurement of the position of a particle destroys any
information about its momentum, and vice versa.
It is not difficult to notice that the paradoxical equivalence (33) is similar to the EPR paradox [10];
in view of that, the authors of [9] termed Einstein’s design “the EPR paradox in the double-slit
experiment”.
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4 How to resolve the paradox
Consider ways to resolve the EPR paradox in the double-slit experiment.
One may assume that the following correspondence takes place:
[[
P plate1P±
(
|Ψplate1〉∈H
plate1
X
) ]]
v
=
[[
P particleP±
(
|Ψparticle〉∈H
particle
X
) ]]
v
. (34)
According to it, the propositions P particleP+ and P
particle
P− must have the value of false in the state
|Ψparticle〉 ∈ H
particle
X because the propositions P
plate1
P+ and P
plate1
P− take on the value of false in the
state |Ψplate1〉 ∈ H
plate1
X . This puts an end to the paradoxical equivalence (33):
[[
P particleX
(
|Ψparticle〉∈H
particle
X
) ]]
v
6=
[[
P particleP±
(
|Ψparticle〉∈H
particle
X
) ]]
v
. (35)
Be it as it may, in view of the fact that the measurements (of the position or the momentum)
on plate 1 are always performed after the particle has interacted with it, the correspondence (34)
implies that the particle “knows” that one decided to measure the position of plate 1 even when the
particle is separated from it by a large distance. In other words, the correspondence (34) implies
that the principle of locality is not applicable in quantum mechanics.
Alternatively, one may argue that the counterfactual truth-values (27) and (29) are not admissible
because they contradict the Kolmogorov axioms [11].
To be sure, consider the probabilities that the propositions P plate1P+ and P
plate1
P− are verified in the
state |Ψplate1〉 ∈ H
plate1
X : In keeping with (27), one finds:
Pr
[
P plate1P±
(
|Ψplate1〉∈H
plate1
X
) ]
= 0 . (36)
But, if the sample space for momentum p of plate 1 is Ω = {positive,negative}, Kolmogorov’s
axioms will imply
Pr
[
P plate1P+
(
|Ψplate1〉∈H
plate1
X
) ]
+ Pr
[
P plate1P−
(
|Ψplate1〉∈H
plate1
X
) ]
= 1 . (37)
Thus, (27), as well as (29), must be nonadmissible, and, as a result, instead of (33) one can find
only
[[
P particleX
(
|Ψparticle〉∈H
particle
X
) ]]
v
= 1 . (38)
However, the admissibility poses an additional problem: Why should the Kolmogorov axioms be
relevant for truth-values of propositions? Really, unlike propositions, probability assignments are
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neither true nor false; that is, probability assignments are not propositions. So, any justifica-
tion of Kolmogorov’s axiomatic system for truth-values will require further assumptions that bring
probabilities into a logic. Putting it differently, without appending more hypotheses, one cannot
rationalize the requirement of admissibility for truth-values of propositions.
5 Giving up the condition of the Hilbert lattice
Unlike the Hilbert lattice L(H), the collection of the invariant-subspace lattices {L(Σ)} is a struc-
ture where a pair of subspaces HQ and HP can be neither comparable nor incomparable with each
other.
To be sure, suppose that subspaces HQ and HP are elements belonging respectively to the posets
L(ΣQ) and L(ΣP ) whose intersection L(ΣQ) ∩ L(ΣP ) contains neither HQ nor HP . In that case,
within the structure of the collection {L(Σ)} = {L(ΣQ),L(ΣP ), . . . }, there is no poset that contains
both HQ and HP , which means that an ordering – i.e., a binary relation over a pair of elements
from one poset – has no meaning for HQ and HP at all.
Hence, giving up the condition of the Hilbert lattice, i.e., the union of the collection {L(Σ)}, the
counterfactual truth-value of the proposition P in the state |Ψ〉 ∈ HQ becomes meaningless, i.e.,
without the truth values. Symbolically, this can be presented by
{HQ,HP } * L(Σ) ∈ {L(ΣQ), L(ΣP ), . . . } :
[[
P (|Ψ〉∈HQ)
]]
v
=
0
0
, (39)
where 0
0
denotes an indeterminate value.
As follows, the relinquishment of the Hilbert lattice condition automatically renders the resolution
of the EPR paradox in the double-slit experiment.
Indeed, within the structure of the collection of the invariant-subspace lattices associated with plate
1, namely,
{
L(Σplate1)
}
≡
{
L
(
Σplate1X
)
, L
(
Σplate1P
)
, . . .
}
, (40)
the subspace Hplate1X from the poset L(Σ
plate1
X ) is neither comparable nor incomparable with the
subspaces Hplate1P+ and H
plate1
P− from the poset L(Σ
plate1
P ). This means that within this structure, the
counterfactual truth-values of the propositions P plate1P+ and P
plate1
P− in the state |Ψplate1〉 ∈ H
plate1
X
have no meaning:
[[
P plate1P±
(
|Ψplate1〉∈H
plate1
X
) ]]
v
=
0
0
. (41)
In the same way, within the structure of the collection of the invariant-subspace lattices associated
with the combined system, i.e.,
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{
L(Σcombined)
}
≡
{
L
(
ΣcombinedX
)
, L
(
ΣcombinedP
)
, . . .
}
, (42)
the subspace HcombinedX ∈ L(Σ
combined
X ) is neither comparable nor incomparable with the subspaces
Hplate1P± ⊗H
particle
P± ∈ L(Σ
combined
P ); therefore,
[[ (
P plate1P± ⊓ P
particle
P±
)(
|Ψcombined〉∈H
combined
X
) ]]
v
=
0
0
. (43)
This gives
[[
P particleP±
(
|Ψparticle〉∈H
particle
X
) ]]
v
=
0
0
. (44)
Accordingly, with no condition of the Hilbert lattice, i.e., without (26) and (28), the paradox (33)
does not emerge.
6 Conclusion remarks
In Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, the nonequivalence of the truth-values of the
propositions Pwave-like and Pparticle-like is simply postulated. Such postulate is of great importance:
Complementarity is the chief foundation on which the orthodox account of quantum theory is built.
According to Bohr, the demand of complementarity in quantum mechanics is logically on a par
with the requirement of relativity in theory of relativity [12].
The question that one may ask is this: Can Bohr’s complementarity principle be emergent? Specif-
ically, can the nonequivalence (1) be derived?
As it follows from the empiric logic analysis of Einstein’s modification of the double-slit experiment,
within the structure of the Hilbert lattice, the nonequivalence of the truth-values of Pwave-like and
Pparticle-like might be explained by the violation of the principle of locality, or by the introduction of
the probabilistic axioms into a logic. However, both such possibilities have a clear physical content
which means that they merely put forward new physical hypotheses in place of the complementarity
principle.
In contrast to this, when the condition of the Hilbert lattice is dropped, the nonequivalence (1)
arises from the Hilbert space formalism without additional hypotheses. One can conclude from
here that the Bohr’s complementarity principle is a result of truth-value gaps which are intrinsic
to the structure of the collection of the invariant-subspace lattices {L(Σ)}. In other words, this
principle is a consequence of the fact that within {L(Σ)} the valuation relations from propositions
to the set {1, 0} are not total functions.
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